Peace talks are negotiations that aim to resolve an ongoing violent conflict. The success of these processes depends on the ability of parties to agree on a political settlement, including addressing grievances and establishing post-conflict power-sharing arrangements. Often, peace processes are complex and include many stakeholders. This raises issues such as how to address the interests of extremists and spoilers, whether to include civil society actors or not, and the degree to which a process is inclusive. This article examines how different decisions about these issues shape the likelihood of concluding a peace agreement.
The decision to set a negotiation framework is an important strategic choice that shapes the outcome of peace talks. Legal codification, publicity, and inclusivity increase a government’s short-term costs, but they also alleviate information asymmetry, commitment, and indivisibility problems, make it easier for negotiators to make sacrifices, and reduce the risk that the adversary will abandon the negotiations (see for example Darby 2001; Mattes and Savun 2009).
The way in which conflict actors define their interests, manage power-sharing disputes, and frame negotiating goals is influenced by the organizational/institutional components of peace agreements. These arrangements/mechanisms promote peace consolidation efforts after an agreement and address the WHAT element of an agreement (see for example United Nations 2009). They can also take form in a variety of ways, from monitoring committees chaired by a neutral third party to organizational/institutional components designed to solve future grievances through political negotiations.